Last Resort: European Central Bank's Permanent Engagement in Tackling Foreign Exchange Liquidity Disruptions in the Euro Area Banking System by Kiss, Gábor Dávid et al.
83
Last Resort: European Central Bank’s 
Permanent Engagement in Tackling Foreign  
Exchange Liquidity Disruptions in the Euro 
Area Banking System*
Gábor Dávid Kiss – Gábor Zoltán Tanács – Edit Lippai-Makra – Tamás Rácz 
Prior to the outbreak of the global financial crisis, the international interbank market 
for key currencies narrowed and market participants faced foreign currency liquidity 
shocks more frequently. The US Federal Reserve was first to address the problem 
with a series of currency swap lines concluded with other major central banks after 
December 2007. Although these measures were initially considered temporary, they 
are still present today in the practices of the leading central banks, and thus of the 
European Central Bank. Inter central bank currency swap lines facilitate, if necessary, 
the provision of an adequate level of foreign currency liquidity to the banking system 
as a kind of “last resort”, on more favourable terms than market conditions. In 
our study, we examined the evolution of the demand for foreign currency liquidity 
provided by the European Central Bank to the euro area banking system between 
2007 and 2019, on quarterly data and using vector autoregression. We found that 
the allocation of dollar-denominated foreign currency resources through the ECB’s 
tenders increases the most when the banking system is unable to raise international 
funds on a market basis, when dollar market tensions rise or when their return on 
assets ratios deteriorate.
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1. Introduction
Fundraising and lending denominated in foreign currency has become significant 
in the banking systems of developed countries since the 1960s. First US dollar 
deposits appeared under the liabilities of Western European credit institutions, 
followed by petrodollars from oil-exporting countries (Madura 2008). At the same 
time, we can now talk about institutional investors in this field who have appeared 
with tax optimisation intentions, and we can also refer to deposit placements from 
capital flight (Kiss – Ampah 2018). We can see that both international trade and 
the institutional weaknesses of developing countries are creating excess foreign 
exchange liquidity in developed markets, which is then allocated: today, the 
dollar accounts for approximately 60 per cent of foreign exchange reserves, the 
international bond market and private lending, the euro 20 per cent, while the 
share of yen and renminbi is below 5 per cent (ECB 2019). However, disruptions in 
the network structure of the international interbank market1 can lead to a serious 
lack of liquidity.
During the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, the flow of international liquid 
capital suddenly narrowed or even stopped suddenly in some channels, which 
made financing on market terms difficult even if the public debt or banking system 
of the given country had not had any problems before. While the resources of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are typically used to address national near-
bankruptcy situations, and during the European sovereign debt crisis the bank 
bailout largely relied on lending via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and 
its predecessors, the conditions of providing short-term foreign currency liquidity 
was less institutionalised. These foreign currency liquidity needs typically stem 
from the turmoil on international financial markets, thus they can emerge quickly 
and vary widely in magnitude. In our study, we will explain the background to this 
ad hoc foreign currency liquidity provision through the example of the European 
Central Bank (ECB), making special reference to currency swap lines established 
by major central banks and regionally. A currency swap can be used extensively, 
inter alia, for liquidity management, risk hedging and short-term yield speculation 
(Mák – Páles 2009), but in the course of our work we analyse these transactions 
solely on the basis of the central banks’ international function to acquire foreign 
currency liquidity. To assess changes in foreign exchange exposure, it is also worth 
separating currency swaps (where the foreign exchange exposure changes) from 
repurchase transactions (where the exposure does not change) conducted with 
foreign currency-denominated securities collateral – however, liquid assets are 
required in both cases.
1  See, for example: The results of Ananda et al. (2012); Allen – Babus (2009) on the topology changes of US 
interbank markets, or Berlinger et al. (2011); Banai et al. (2015) on that of the Hungarian.
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Although it seemed at first that the European banking system would only turn to 
the ECB for foreign exchange liquidity on a temporary basis, practice shows that 
this instrument has had to be used for almost 13 years, and the COVID-19 crisis in 
2020 has further increased the amount of capital allocated. In the course of our 
work therefore, we examine the change in the capital allocated by the ECB in US 
dollar-denominated tenders with euro area credit institutions between 2007 and 
2019, using a vector autoregression model. To this end, we analysed the ratio of 
the non-euro-area non-euro denominated liabilities of the banking system to the 
balance sheet total, the dollar market tensions indicated by the EUR-USD basis 
swap, the banking system’s return on assets and the structural changes on the 
asset side of the ECB’s balance sheet. To establish the foundations of the theoretical 
model, we first present the evolution of currency swap lines between central banks 
during the period under review, as well as the relevant practice of the ECB. Next, 
we describe the data and methodology used, and finally, we evaluate the obtained 
results in light of the intuitions formulated for the theoretical model. We found that, 
although financing costs did not, the other variables had a significant impact even 
in the medium term on euro area credit institutions turning to the ECB when they 
needed foreign exchange liquidity.
2. Theoretical background
Prior to the global financial crisis, between 2003 and 2007 the aggregate loan-to-
deposit ratio of euro area banks was above 100 per cent, and financed increasingly 
from money market funds in addition to significant bond holdings (ECB 2008). 
This chapter summarises the central bank swap lines and the changes to the euro 
area banking system that have led to an appreciation of the ECB’s role in providing 
stable foreign currency liquidity to the banking system as a direct consequence 
of the above situation. The fact this role has remained and has accompanied 
the functioning of the ECB to this day is also reflected in the theoretical model 
developed in this study.
2.1. Swap lines between central banks
In the toolbox of unconventional monetary policy that spread following the 2007-
2008 global financial crisis, in addition to the bond market’s function of “market 
maker of last resort”, the instrument of foreign currency funding was added to 
the traditional “lender of last resort”2 function of central banks (typically for short 
maturities, O/N and 3-month) (BIS 2011; Seghezza 2018; Ács 2011). This is because 
a central bank may also decide not to invest an existing foreign currency resource 
in a foreign asset, but to continue lending to national credit institutions, which 
2  Although the term “lender of last resort” is used in international literature, due to the mass application of 
repo transactions, this means funding in a broader sense. 
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would, however, result in a decrease in foreign exchange reserves. Since foreign 
exchange reserves must meet the expectations set by credit rating agencies and 
other stakeholders (e.g., Guidotti-Greenspan and M2 rules), it seemed appropriate 
to expand the range of foreign exchange sources (Obstfeld et al. 2009). This can 
be realised by issuing bonds in foreign currency (which in turn are considered 
government securities), collecting deposits in foreign currency, or borrowing 
(from another central bank or the Bank for International Settlements), but this 
is more difficult to achieve in a market with a lack of liquidity. In this case, it is 
possible to borrow within an institutionalised framework (IMF or Regional Financing 
Agreements) or to resort to alternative, ad-hoc foreign exchange resources 
(interbank swap and repo lines) (Antal – Gereben 2011). 
In a currency swap between central banks, the two central banks lend to the other 
party in their own currency, thus taking both spot and forward positions3, where 
the exchange rate difference between the two positions is the swap point. A swap 
line can provide access to foreign currency liquidity in a decentralised manner, 
which seems faster and more flexible compared to the terms of an institutionalised 
(e.g. IMF) loan4. As a result, however, currency swap lines can have a number of 
pitfalls: their creation requires a counterparty central bank with opposing foreign 
exchange demand; at the end of the line, the counterparty may decide to terminate 
the continuation; central banks issuing key currencies are free to choose between 
potential counterparties and there is a lack of collateral against default5 (Destais 
2016). 
Inter-central bank ad-hoc currency swap lines have appeared on international 
markets since the 1920s, typically with a maturity of 3 months, which the US Federal 
Reserve (Fed) raised to a higher level from 1962 by establishing the network of 
swap lines, also including Western central banks and the BIS, to address imbalances 
arising from the Triffin paradox6 (Bordo et al. 2015). At the focus of this was the 
dollar as the gold-backed world money of that time. From the post-Bretton Woods 
era we can mention the 2001 dollar swap line, where now the ECB appeared as the 
issuer of the newly created euro. 
The transitional (6-month) inter-central bank dollar swap line, initially with 
four leading central banks (Canadian, British, Swiss and the ECB), established in 
3  The market can deviate significantly from the level justified by the covered interest rate parity due to stress, 
as stated by Csávás – Szabó (2010). Brophy et al. (2019) added to this the additional biases resulting from 
central bank bond purchase programs. 
4  In particular due to its budgetary and economic policy implications, which are completely missing from 
a swap line.
5  Although in this case it is also possible to conclude a repo agreement.
6  The dollar was a national currency and a key global currency at the same time, so while the latter requires 
the US balance of payments to be in a deficit to satisfy international dollar requirements (resulting in an 
outflow of gold reserves in the long run), the short-term domestic economic policy objectives might run 
counter to this.
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December 2007, elevated the Fed to the position of international lender of last 
resort. The other central banks of the G10 countries joined this in March 2008, and 
subsequently the Central Bank of Japan in September 2008. The agreements were 
regularly renewed every six months, while on 1 February 2010, the international 
financial markets apparently no longer required this type of channel, therefore 
the central banks considered the cooperation closed7. However, this kind of 
optimism did not prove lasting, as this type of transitional dollar swap line had to 
be re-established in May 20108 (Figure 1). Following a series of renewals to the 
cooperation, the counterparties reached a point in December 2011 where they were 
able to swap not only in dollars but also in their own currencies9 (i.e. in Canadian 
dollars, pounds, yen, Swiss francs and euros, in addition to the US dollar). By the 
end of October 2013, it became clear to the parties that the “transitional” swap 
lines, which had been ongoing for almost six years, could not yet be cancelled for 
a long time, despite the temporary easing of foreign exchange liquidity needs, thus 
the six founding central banks entered into a standing arrangement10. 
7  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2007/html/pr071212.en.html 
8  https://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre_20100510_3/source/pre_20100510_3.en.pdf 
9  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111130.en.html
10  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr131031.en.html 
Figure 1
Value of swap lines entered into by the Fed with central banks (weekly average, 
million dollars, plotted on a logarithmic scale)
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Under the agreements, the liquidity thus acquired was lent by central banks 
through various channels: the ECB typically conducted repo tenders with O/N, 
1-week, 1-month and 3-month maturities. The severity of the market problem is 
well illustrated by the fact that the ECB still carries out lending in US dollars to this 
day, meaning that between December 2007 and March 2020, the purely market-
based international financing did not fully recover in reserve currencies either! 
Thus, the “last resort” function has now verifiably been added to the tasks of the 
leading central banks, also in ensuring the adequate foreign currency liquidity of 
the banking system.
In the case of a central bank issuing a reserve currency, it is expected that it will 
easily be able to find a counterparty for a currency swap as it provides loans to the 
other party in a foreign currency that can be lent domestically. And if the liquidity 
needs of the banking sector would not absorb this type of liquidity, it can still 
replenish its international reserves. The individual regional interbank swap lines 
add further nuances to the situation: in October 2008, the Fed entered into similar 
agreements with the central banks of Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and Singapore 
(Seghezza 2018). Similarly, the Scandinavian (Danish, Norwegian and Swedish) 
central banks were able to obtain dollar liquidity. This is interesting because the 
very same central banks concluded euro swap lines with the ECB too in autumn 
2008, while from May 2008 they entered into euro swap lines with the central bank 
of Iceland, then of Latvia in December 2008, and finally from May 2009 with the 
Estonian central bank. Subsequently, this kind of solidarity was embodied in the 
conclusion of a cooperation agreement11 in August 2010, which institutionalised 
cross-border financial stability, crisis management and bank consolidation. The 
rationale behind the Nordic Baltic Stability Group was the Baltic dominance of 
Swedish banks, and its success is clearly shown by the accession of the Baltic 
countries to the euro area and the renewal of cooperation in 201812. 
The ECB also entered into euro-pound and euro-Swiss franc swap lines between 
2008 and 2010. However, with respect to non-euro area Member States (e.g. Poland, 
Hungary and Latvia), it mainly gave priority to covered repurchase agreements (by 
accepting euro-denominated bonds) (Allen – Moessner 2010). By contrast, the Swiss 
and Polish central banks entered into a Swiss franc-zloty swap line in 2012. We 
can state that in the case of small, emerging, open economies, it was still best to 
address capital flow disruptions through the institutional instrument of conditional 
lending, the IMF loan – even if Poland did not use the flexible credit line made 
available to it between 2009 and 2017. According to the results of Obstfeld et al. 
(2009), the inadequacy of foreign exchange reserves relative to M2 in emerging 
11  https://www.cb.is/publications/news/news/2010/08/17/Nordic-and-Baltic-Ministries--Central-Banks-and-
Supervisory-Authorities-sign-Agreement-on-Financial-Stability-/ 
12  https://www.fi.se/en/published/news/2018/new-nordic-baltic-memorandum-of-understanding/ 
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countries well explains the devaluation of currencies, and the fact that the swap 
lines implemented can be considered rather symbolic in terms of their magnitude 
is also attributable to this. 
Contrary to the above, the motivation for the renminbi swap lines entered into by 
the Chinese central bank after 2008 was not a central bank response to the shock 
manifested in the availability of an already fully used reserve currency, but rather 
another attempt to resolve the Triffin dilemma (Seghezza 2018). Namely, based on 
this, the renminbi liquidity received during the agreement should appear among the 
liabilities then among the assets of the banking system, thus gaining an increasing 
role in the line of international means of payment (Engelberth – Sági 2017). 
Global dollar funding depends on the operation of both US and non-US (typically 
Japanese, UK, Canadian, French, German and Dutch) banks. In the case of Japanese 
banks, while Aldasoro et al. (2019) observed a significant increase, a near doubling, 
of dollar-denominated assets between 2007 and 2017 as traditional commercial 
banking activity improved, in the case of European banks the asset and liability sides 
more than halved during this time and short-term arbitrage transactions began to 
gain priority. Dollar funding for non-US global banks comes primarily through US 
money market funds, which used repo-type channels to a lesser extent and non-
repo type13 channels to a greater extent in an increasingly concentrated market 
during the 2010s. For these funds, the Fed’s overnight reverse repo instrument 
represents the safest investment alternative in addition to short-term government 
bonds, thus a position with non-US banks should provide a premium above this.
2.2. ECB’s foreign currency lending
In the autumn of 2007, the European banking system not only had significant 
leverage on its US counterpart, but also had significant US exposures on the asset 
side (Pelle – Végh 2019). Companies with international foreign currency income, 
other actors with domestic foreign currency income on the asset side of the bank 
balance sheet, as well as the ratio of foreign currency resources all determine 
the extent of any currency mismatch in the case of a credit institution (Destais 
2016; Mák – Páles 2009). The liabilities side includes foreign currency deposits of 
domestic or foreign institutional investors, as well as short-term bonds issued in 
foreign currency or repo transactions, which require frequent renewal due to the 
maturity transformation. 
13  Short-term securities, such as: commercial paper, certificates of deposit, asset backed commercial papers.
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The renewal of foreign currency liquidity can be particularly problematic when the 
weight of foreign currency resources is relatively high within the balance sheet 
(
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). Páles et al. (2010), for example, derives the change in the derivative 
position with non-residents from the net borrowing requirement as the difference 
between non-debt-generating capital inflows, forint and foreign currency debt, the 
actual open position of the banking system and the derivative position with the 
domestic private sector. Although the use of foreign currency resources is typically 
mentioned in literature when describing the inconsistency of foreign currency 
devaluations in developing countries (see Frankel 2011 for example), as mentioned 
in the previous subsection, a currency mismatch can cause a problem in developed 
markets too. 
According to14 Destais (2016), since the collateral behind an inter-central bank swap 
line is created by the quality of credit institution use and the ability to repay, this 
credibility is ultimately a macroprudential issue (Baker 2013). The rate of return 
on assets (ROAt) can thus have a direct effect on the desirability of a bank in the 
international interbank market if it wants to acquire foreign currency liquidity. In 
the case of rational market participants, a deteriorating ROA could push the market 
towards central bank foreign currency auctions. This kind of “aversion” may also 
stem from tensions in the international dollar market, which can be captured most 
effectively by the change in the basis swap between the two key currencies, the 
dollar and the euro (
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), after Kick et al. (2018) demonstrated the effective 
pass-through of the US financing environment into the euro area. In the course 
of their work, the effects of the Fed’s unconventional actions on dollar financing 
were felt by German banks. Based on Figure 2, we can conclude that the ECB has to 
conduct foreign currency repo tenders primarily in US dollars, while the appearance 
of the Swiss franc has proven to be episodic. From the perspective of our work, 
therefore, we will focus on the change in the dollar liquidity (KUSD,t) provided by 
the ECB in tenders.
14  In the case of market-based swaps there is a margin requirement; the value of margin call for the total 
net swap portfolio maturing in foreign currency at i times in relation to the VOLi contract not yet expired: 
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, 
where S0,i is the spot exchange rate of each i transaction at the time of conclusion, st is the spot exchange 
rate, Nt is the number of transactions not expired at the given time (Páles et al. 2010).
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Last Resort: European Central Bank’s Permanent Engagement in Tackling Foreign...
The issue of foreign currency liquidity provided by the ECB within the euro area 
is not a much-studied area in literature; the analysis of cross-border lending in 
a reserve currency is a much more popular topic. Alvarez et al. (2017) described 
the phasing out of longer maturities for the various interbank foreign currency 
swap lines (1-week, 1-month and 3-month) following the passing of global crises, 
emphasising that the ECB provides dollar liquidity to the euro area banking system 
mainly through repo tenders against adequate collateral. So in the latter case we 
cannot talk about a change in foreign currency exposure, whereas in the case 
of a foreign currency swap, we can. However, market demand for the latter has 
dropped significantly since 2009.
Takáts – Temesvary (2020) also focuses primarily on the monetary policy 
transmission effects of cross-border foreign currency lending, emphasising that 
monetary policy impacts on cross-border foreign currency lending even if neither 
the lender nor the debtor is resident. On the other hand, the interbank role of this 
type of lending is negligible, basically non-bank actors have emerged as debtors. 
Similarly to them, Avdjiev et al. (2016) examined cross-border lending in euros, 
incidentally finding a 30 per cent share of the dollar in the euro area in this area. 
In their model, in addition to variables describing lending, the exchange rate was 
also present in addition to banks’ share prices and sovereign risk. In their work, they 
found that, in addition to the international dollar-denominated lending network, 
there is also a more modest, but euro-denominated lending network that is 
gaining momentum due to the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy. However, by 
Figure 2
Developments in US dollar and Swiss franc liquidity lent in the ECB’s repo tenders 
between 2007 and 2020 (€ million)
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specifically examining the lending of European banks in dollars, Ivashina et al. (2015) 
found that the increase in lending in euros was accompanied by a deterioration 
in the quality of the loans they provided. Parallel to this, they also highlight the 
narrowing of traditional market channels, which has made access to dollar liquidity 
expensive. Albrizio et al. (2020) originates the decline in cross-border dollar lending 
from the monetary shock resulting from the exogenous tightening of the Fed. In 
addition, Aizenman et al. (2020) and Seghezza (2018) thoroughly examined the 
relationship between the composition and relative size of international foreign 
currency reserves and macro variables, looking at the impact of swap lines 
separately, however, the authors do not analyse the specific demand set by credit 
institutions themselves vis-à-vis their central bank with respect to the motivation 
to acquire foreign currency liquidity. 
2.3. Theoretical model
In summarising the literature, we found that the motivation for swap lines between 
central banks was that commercial banks had difficulty accessing foreign currency 
funding in international interbank markets. To satisfy this hunger for foreign 
currency liquidity, central banks provided liquidity obtained through international 
swap lines through tenders for their own banking system. This is the ratio of dollar 
liquidity provided in a given quarter to total lending measured over the entire 
period, denoted by 
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 in our model as the result variable. The ratio of non-euro-
area liabilities of euro area credit institutions to total assets (
Kiss	et	al	képletek:		
2.2.	alfejezet	2.	bekezdésében:	
𝐿𝐿"#$,&
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿&
> 0 	
2.2.	alfejezet	3.	bekezdésében:	
𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆
,-,#./.01
	
16.	lábjegyzetben:		
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶& =
𝑠𝑠& − 𝑆𝑆7,8
𝑆𝑆&
9:
8;7
∙ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿8 	
2.3.	alfejezet	1.	bekezdésében:	
𝐾𝐾.01,&
𝐾𝐾.01
	
	
𝐿𝐿"#$,&
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿&
	
	
𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆
,-,#./.01
	
	
𝐿𝐿& + 𝑆𝑆&
𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋&
	
∆
𝐾𝐾.01,&
𝐾𝐾.01
= 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛽𝛽F∆
𝐿𝐿"#$,&
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿&
+ 𝛽𝛽G∆
𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆
,-,#./.01,&
100
+ 𝛽𝛽,∆𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅& + 𝛽𝛽K∆
𝐿𝐿& + 𝑆𝑆&
𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋&
+ 𝛽𝛽L𝑑𝑑#$N,& + 𝛽𝛽O𝑑𝑑PQ&,&	 (1)	
	
A	3.1.	alfejezetben	a	3.	ábra	alatti	bekezdésben:	
	
𝐿𝐿& + 𝑆𝑆&
𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋&
	
	
𝑦𝑦& = 𝑅𝑅F𝑦𝑦&SF + ⋯+ 𝑅𝑅U𝑦𝑦&SU + 𝜀𝜀&,	 (2)	
	 	
𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦& = 𝑅𝑅FW𝑦𝑦&SF + ⋯+ 𝑅𝑅UW𝑦𝑦&SU + 𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢&,	ahol	𝜀𝜀& = 𝑅𝑅SF𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢&	és	𝑆𝑆 = 𝑅𝑅SF𝐵𝐵.	 (3)	
	 	
𝜀𝜀& = 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢& =
𝑠𝑠FF 0 0
𝑠𝑠GF 𝑠𝑠GG 0
𝑠𝑠,F 𝑠𝑠,G 𝑠𝑠,,
	
𝑢𝑢F&
𝑢𝑢G&
𝑢𝑢,&
.	 (4)	
	
	 	
𝐼𝐼 − 𝑅𝑅F − ⋯− 𝑅𝑅U
SF
𝜀𝜀& = Ψ𝜀𝜀& = 𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢&	és	𝐹𝐹 =
𝑓𝑓FF 0 0
𝑓𝑓GF 𝑓𝑓GG 0
𝑓𝑓,F 𝑓𝑓,G 𝑓𝑓,,
,	míg	𝑆𝑆 =
𝑠𝑠FF 𝑠𝑠FG 𝑠𝑠F,
𝑠𝑠GF 𝑠𝑠GG 𝑠𝑠G,
𝑠𝑠,F 𝑠𝑠,G 𝑠𝑠,,
.	 (5)	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
) characterises 
the external exposure of the banking system well. As an indicator of dollar market 
tensions, we use the 3-month EUR-USD basis swap15 (
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), the negative value 
of which indicates an increase in funding in dollars. The profitability of the credit 
institutions involved was included in the model using return on assets (ROAt). The 
ECB’s securities market (St) and lending (Lt) practices that are becoming active were 
measured by the (
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) ratio measuring the restructuring of the central bank’s 
balance sheet and apportioning with the international reserve (FXt). 
The fractures in capital flows due to changes in business cycles were represented 
by the dummy variable of the recession (dEZr,t) emerging in the euro area. On the 
other hand, to ensure the normal distribution of the error terms of the regressions, 
it was advisable to include a dummy variable (dout,t) representing the fall of dollar 
liquidity to zero.
15  Currency Basis Swap: 3M EURIBOR/3M USD LIBOR, ICAP
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In the course of our work, we examine the above variables using the following 
theoretical model between 2007 Q4 and 2019 Q4 (t=1:49):
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 (1)
In this model, we can formulate the following intuitive expectations for each 
coefficient: increasing external exposure could mean that credit institutions are 
able to raise funds on a market basis and are therefore expected to make less 
use of the ECB’s dollar liquidity allocation tenders, thus β1 < 0 is expected. The 
declining level of the foreign currency swap reflects the banks’ increasing hunger 
for liquidity, which encourages the ECB to increase its dollar liquidity lending 
(β2 < 0). If the ROA falls, it is expected that banks will rely much more on a form of 
financing that is more favourable than the market, thus we expect a (β3 < 0) negative 
coefficient here. The increasingly serious credit and securities market interventions 
by the central bank indicates the liquidity allocation in foreign currency (β4 > 0). 
The appearance of these expectations can also be expected at the level of impulse 
response functions and variance decompositions. The theoretical model was tested 
using Eviews 11 software. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data
The dollar-denominated swap lines of leading central banks have gained major 
traction since December 2007, thus the sample under review covers 49 quarters 
between the last quarters of 2007 and 2019. The sources of the data used were 
as follows: information on lending in foreign currency tenders was downloaded 
from the ECB’s database listing open market operations denominated in foreign 
currency16, and then data on individual tenders were aggregated to a quarterly basis 
as described in the theoretical model subsection. Balance sheet and ROA data for 
euro area credit institutions were downloaded from the relevant statistical database 
of the ECB17. The foreign currency basis swap time series was downloaded from 
the Refinitiv Eikon database. The dummy variable, which symbolises the recession 
quarters of the euro area, was created based on a database of the European 
Commission18.
16  https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/html/top_history.en.html 
17  http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9691316 
18  https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/bcc/bcc.html 
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Figure 3 shows that the peak in allocated dollar liquidity fell predominantly on 
2008 and 2010 followed by a second wave from late 2011 to mid-2014, and then 
stabilised at a low level after 2015. Parallel to this, the ECB’s lending and securities 
purchasing activity increased markedly in the first half of 2010, but it is clearly 
visible how the 
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- indicator started to increase significantly in the first half of 
the decade following the QE announcement. 
The drop in the value of return on assets shown in Figure 4 closely followed the 
fluctuations in economic cycles, while the ratio of the banking sector’s external 
resources to total assets declined steadily over the period under review, from an 
initial 15 per cent to close to 10 to 11 per cent. It is clearly visible that dollar funding 
disruptions typically emerged at the beginning of the recession periods, but the 
3-month EUR-USD basis swap remained negative throughout. 
Figure 3
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3.2. Methodology
Vector autoregressive (VAR) processes characterise the data generation process of 
a smaller amount of time series variable, where a priori endogeneity is assumed for 
each variable and their dynamics are taken into account. This procedure records the 
dynamic interactions of a set of time series variables of N number: yt = (y1t ,…, yKt)’. 
The basic VAR model can be described in the following reduced form (2) based on 
Lütkepohl – Kratzig (2004):
 
Kiss	et	al	képletek:		
2.2.	alfejezet	2.	bekezdésében:	
𝐿𝐿"#$,&
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿&
> 0 	
2.2.	alfejezet	3.	bekezdésében:	
𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆
,-,#./.01
	
16.	lábjegyzetben:		
𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶& =
𝑠𝑠& − 𝑆𝑆7,8
𝑆𝑆&
9:
8;7
∙ 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿8 	
2.3.	alfejezet	1.	bekezdésében:	
𝐾𝐾.01,&
𝐾𝐾.01
	
	
𝐿𝐿"#$,&
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿&
	
	
𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆
,-,#./.01
	
	
𝐿𝐿& + 𝑆𝑆&
𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋&
	
	
∆
𝐾𝐾.01,&
𝐾𝐾.01
= 𝜔𝜔 + 𝛽𝛽F∆
𝐿𝐿"#$,&
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿&
+ 𝛽𝛽G∆
𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆
,-,#./.01,&
100
+ 𝛽𝛽,∆𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅& + 𝛽𝛽K∆
𝐿𝐿& + 𝑆𝑆&
𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋&
+ 𝛽𝛽L𝑑𝑑#$N,& + 𝛽𝛽O𝑑𝑑PQ&,&	 (1)	
	
A	3.1.	alfejezetben	a	3.	ábra	alatti	bekezdésben:	
	
𝐿𝐿& + 𝑆𝑆&
𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋&
	
	
𝑦𝑦& = 𝑅𝑅F𝑦𝑦&SF + ⋯+ 𝑅𝑅U𝑦𝑦&SU + 𝜀𝜀&,	 (2)	
	 	
𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦& = 𝑅𝑅FW𝑦𝑦&SF + ⋯+ 𝑅𝑅UW𝑦𝑦&SU + 𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢&,	ahol	𝜀𝜀& = 𝑅𝑅SF𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢&	és	𝑆𝑆 = 𝑅𝑅SF𝐵𝐵.	 (3)	
	 	
𝜀𝜀& = 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢& =
𝑠𝑠FF 0 0
𝑠𝑠GF 𝑠𝑠GG 0
𝑠𝑠,F 𝑠𝑠,G 𝑠𝑠,,
	
𝑢𝑢F&
𝑢𝑢G&
𝑢𝑢,&
.	 (4)	
	
	 	
𝐼𝐼 − 𝑅𝑅F − ⋯− 𝑅𝑅U
SF
𝜀𝜀& = Ψ𝜀𝜀& = 𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢&	és	𝐹𝐹 =
𝑓𝑓FF 0 0
𝑓𝑓GF 𝑓𝑓GG 0
𝑓𝑓,F 𝑓𝑓,G 𝑓𝑓,,
,	míg	𝑆𝑆 =
𝑠𝑠FF 𝑠𝑠FG 𝑠𝑠F,
𝑠𝑠GF 𝑠𝑠GG 𝑠𝑠G,
𝑠𝑠,F 𝑠𝑠,G 𝑠𝑠,,
.	 (5)	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
 (2)
where yt is the (Nx1) vector containing the model variables, Fi is a matrix containing 
(NxN) autoregression coefficients, and εt = (u1t ,…, uKt)’ is the unobserved error 
term, which is a vector with (Nx1) Gaussian distribution containing a discrete 
representation white noise process and εt ~ (0, E(ut , ut’ )) is a positive definite 
covariance matrix. Weak stationarity is expected for input variables, while the 
Figure 4
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error terms of the equation lack autocorrelation (Ljung–Box p > 0.05 for each time 
lag or 1.85 < Durbin–Watson < 2.15) and normal distribution (Jarque–Bera-test 
p > 0.05) is desirable. 
When writing equation (2), several restrictions of the parameters are conceivable: 
in the case of Cholesky’s writing, the short-term restriction can be used to describe 
the sequence of shocks, while with Blanchard–Quah’s long-term restriction, the 
appearance of the shock can be described. To do this, we first need to introduce 
the structural (3) version of the reduced VAR form (with a time lag p and three 
variables with structural coefficients A and As):
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 (3)
In Cholesky’s restriction (4), we assume that the value of certain coefficients is zero 
and u1t immediately affects the other variables concurrently, while u2t affects only 
variables 2 and 3 concurrently, and u3t only the third:
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+ 𝛽𝛽G∆
𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆
,-,#./.01,&
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+ 𝛽𝛽,∆𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉𝑅𝑅& + 𝛽𝛽K∆
𝐿𝐿& + 𝑆𝑆&
𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋&
+ 𝛽𝛽L𝑑𝑑#$N,& + 𝛽𝛽O𝑑𝑑PQ&,&	 (1)	
	
A	3.1.	alfejezetben	a	3.	ábra	alatti	bekezdésben:	
	
𝐿𝐿& + 𝑆𝑆&
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𝑦𝑦& = 𝑅𝑅F𝑦𝑦&SF + ⋯+ 𝑅𝑅U𝑦𝑦&SU + 𝜀𝜀&,	 (2)	
	 	
𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦& = 𝑅𝑅FW𝑦𝑦&SF + ⋯+ 𝑅𝑅UW𝑦𝑦&SU + 𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢&,	ahol	𝜀𝜀& = 𝑅𝑅SF𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢&	és	𝑆𝑆 = 𝑅𝑅SF𝐵𝐵.	 (3)	
	 	
𝜀𝜀& = 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢& =
𝑠𝑠FF 0 0
𝑠𝑠GF 𝑠𝑠GG 0
𝑠𝑠,F 𝑠𝑠,G 𝑠𝑠,,
	
𝑢𝑢F&
𝑢𝑢G&
𝑢𝑢,&
.	 (4)	
	
	 	
𝐼𝐼 − 𝑅𝑅F − ⋯− 𝑅𝑅U
SF
𝜀𝜀& = Ψ𝜀𝜀& = 𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢&	és	𝐹𝐹 =
𝑓𝑓FF 0 0
𝑓𝑓GF 𝑓𝑓GG 0
𝑓𝑓,F 𝑓𝑓,G 𝑓𝑓,,
,	míg	𝑆𝑆 =
𝑠𝑠FF 𝑠𝑠FG 𝑠𝑠F,
𝑠𝑠GF 𝑠𝑠GG 𝑠𝑠G,
𝑠𝑠,F 𝑠𝑠,G 𝑠𝑠,,
.	 (5)	
	 	
	
	
	
	
	
 (4)
By contrast, in the long-term restriction of Blanchard – Quah (1989) (5), the shock 
is searched for only in the row of the F-matrix where the variable appears, and the 
cumulative long-term effect of the shock is zero and Ψ the long-term multiplier 
(F = ΨS) is:
Kiss	et	al	képletek	angol	anyagban	változás	(angol	szavak):		
	
	
𝐴𝐴𝑦𝑦# = 𝐴𝐴%&𝑦𝑦#'% + ⋯+ 𝐴𝐴*&𝑦𝑦#'* + 𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢#,	where	𝜀𝜀# = 𝐴𝐴'%𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢#	and	𝑆𝑆 = 𝐴𝐴'%𝐵𝐵.	 (3)	
	
	 	
𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴% − ⋯− 𝐴𝐴*
'%
𝜀𝜀# = Ψ𝜀𝜀# = 𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢#	and	𝐹𝐹 =
𝑓𝑓%% 0 0
𝑓𝑓5% 𝑓𝑓55 0
𝑓𝑓6% 𝑓𝑓65 𝑓𝑓66
,	while	𝑆𝑆 =
𝑠𝑠%% 𝑠𝑠%5 𝑠𝑠%6
𝑠𝑠5% 𝑠𝑠55 𝑠𝑠56
𝑠𝑠6% 𝑠𝑠65 𝑠𝑠66
.	 (5)	
	 	
	
 (4)
The structure of the F-matrix describing long-term effects (Table 1) when using 
the Eviews programme determined the order of the variables loaded into the 
VAR model19 at the same time – given that there will be a shock that will affect 
each variable, and the variable at the end of the sequence will be the one that 
only affects itself. Shocks from the dollar liquidity-providing tenders of the ECB as 
the leading central bank should affect the other variables included in the model, 
otherwise their effectiveness would be questionable. However, in the long run the 
shocks of the EUR-USD basis swap rate can no longer have a significant effect on 
the development of the amount lent (f12=0). For the shocks of the banking system’s 
exposure outside the euro area, the swap rate and the ECB’s liquidity lending can 
be interpreted as externalities, therefore their long-term impact can be considered 
19  In our case this means running the following script:  
var var1.ls 1 5 dkih_usd deurcbs3m dez_kivuli_forras dlsfx droa @ c dummy_ez_rec dummy_outlier
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zero (f13=0, f23=0). The change in the asset-side structure of the central bank’s 
balance sheet maps the use of the full, conventional and non-conventional toolbox 
(excluding possible changes in leverage), but by its nature this cannot describe 
either the development of dollar liquidity, the swap rate or the external exposure 
of the banking system (f14=0, f24=0, f34=0). In the normal course of business, the 
goal is not to consider the banking system’s return on assets (ROA) in the long run 
in terms of conducting monetary policy or market financing conditions (f15=0, f25=0, 
f35=0, f45=0). 
Table 1
Structure of F-matrix containing long-term effects
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A	3.2.	alfejezetben	1.	táblázat	sorai,	oszlopai	(később	4.1.	alfejezetben	2.	táblázatban sorokban	
is):	
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∆
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A	3.2.	alfejezetben	1.	táblázatot	követő	bekezdésekben:	
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𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐8,a
Gb
^;7
𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐8,e
G"
e;F
b
^;7
	
f11 0 0 0 0
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A	3.2.	alfejezetben	1.	táblázat	sorai,	oszlopai	(később	4.1.	alfejezetben	2.	táblázatban	sorokban	
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Impulse response functions are the effect of a unit shock on a given model variable, 
wher  the shock of variable i to variable j, ceteris paribus, is simply the order of the 
elements in row i and column j, in the 
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 matrix.
The variance decomposition makes it possible to determine which shocks are 
decisive in the short- and long-term evolution of certain variables, i.e. the proportion 
of the uncertainty of variable i that can be attributed to the jth shock after period h: 
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is):	
∆
𝐾𝐾.01,&
𝐾𝐾.01
	
	
∆
𝑏𝑏𝑆𝑆
,-,#./.01
100
	
	
∆
𝐿𝐿"#$,&
𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿&
	
	
∆
𝐿𝐿& + 𝑆𝑆&
𝐹𝐹𝑋𝑋&
	
	
∆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅& 	
	
A	3.2.	alfejezetben	1.	táblázatot	követő	bekezdésekben:	
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	.
4. Results
The results of the calculations based on the theoretical model are presented in three 
steps: first we present the basic statistics of the logarithmic changes of the input 
variables, then we present the equations obtained from VAR fittings and the results of 
tests examining non-autocorrelation and the normal distribution of error terms. Finally, 
the resulting impulse response functions and variance decompositions are plotted.
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4.1. Basic statistics 
As can be seen from Table 2, only stationary variables were included in the VAR 
model, which in some cases proved to be of normal distribution. Dummy variables 
are designed to compensate for the outstanding kurtosis of lent dollar liquidity and 
the foreign currency basis swap. 
Table 2
Basic statistics of input variables
Test Central momentums Normal distribution
Auto-
correlation
Hetero-
scedasticity Unit-root
variable average skewness peakedness kurtosis Jarque–Bera (p)
Ljung–Box 
(p)
ARCH-LM 
(p) ADF (p)
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A	3.2.	alfejezetben	1.	táblázat	sorai,	oszlopai	(később	4.1.	alfejezetben	2.	táblázatban	sorokban	
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4.2. VAR model
The time lag of the VAR model was determined partly based on the information 
criteria (Schwarz IC recommended a 5-quarter time lag) and partly based on the 
normal distribution and non-autocorrelation of the error terms. AIC and HQ criteria 
suggested a 6-quarter time lag, but those models did not have normally distributed 
error terms, therefore we opted for the 5-quarter time lag model. 
As shown in Table 3, the LM-test testing autocorrelation shows that the error terms 
of the VAR equation meet the requirements for non-autocorrelation, and their 
distribution is also normal based on the Jarque–Bera test. The S and F-matrices of 
the structural model are contained in Table 4 of the Annex.
99
Last Resort: European Central Bank’s Permanent Engagement in Tackling Foreign...
Table 3
Examination of error terms of the two VAR equations: non-autocorrelation and 
normal distribution
 time lag p-value
LM-test
h-time lag
1 0.3037
2 0.9204
3 0.7095
4 0.8209
5 0.2207
6 0.8137
1:h time lag
1 0.3037
2 0.4463
3 NA
4 NA
5 NA
6 NA
Jarque–Bera Joint 0.7959
Note: NA: No data available
Source: Plotted with Eviews 11 software
4.3. Impulse response functions and variance decomposition 
The cumulative impulse response functions calculated using the long-term 
restrictions used in the structural VAR model (Figure 5) show a negative effect of 
the change in non-euro area liabilities in commercial bank balance sheets losing 
significance after 5 quarters, in addition to the ongoing self-stimulating change 
in dollar lending – the increase in the ratio was accompanied by declining use of 
ECB’s dollar auctions. That is, in such cases, the banking sector was able to finance 
itself on market basis. Although the declining value of foreign currency basis swaps 
suggests an increase in dollar market tensions, in the first quarter the lending had 
a counter-intuitive sign20. An increase in return on assets (ROA) over 3 quarters will 
result in a decrease in tendered dollar liquidity. The expansion of non-conventional 
lending and securities purchase programs ((L+S)/FX) is accompanied by a decline 
in dollar liquidity placement in addition to the 4-quarter time lag, suggesting 
that dollar liquidity placements had already been over when securities market 
programs rose. Based on the results obtained, the assumptions of the model can 
only be interpreted in the long run to a significant extent with a time lag of a few 
quarters. The VAR model was also fitted with several alignments of the F-matrix, 
but qualitatively similar results to those above were obtained. 
20  The variable retained this property even with multiple writings of the structural F-matrix, so this result 
can be considered robust.
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Figure 5
Cumulated impulse response functions of the structural VAR model
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Figure 5
Cumulated impulse response functions of the structural VAR model
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Based on the variance decompositions performed (Figure 6), the variance of the 
change in dollar liquidity provided by the ECB has been affected by the variables 
in the model for several quarters, to almost 70 per cent. The weight of non-euro-
area funds declines from an initial 27 per cent to close to 20 per cent in the second 
quarter, which is similar to the weight of changes in the basis swap and ROA. 
Meanwhile, the importance of the central bank’s balance sheet structure remained 
between 10 and 15 per cent throughout. 
5. Summary
In the course of our work, we first reviewed the agreements that led to each leading 
central bank providing one another with foreign currency liquidity after December 
2007 in order to fulfil their role as the “last resort” in supplying adequate foreign 
currency liquidity. We then outlined our theoretical model and described the 
data included in the study. We analysed the statements made in the model using 
structural vector autoregression that examines long-term correlations.
Overall, the model we have written has been validated with euro area credit 
institutions turning to the ECB for dollar-denominated foreign currency liquidity 
mainly when it has become difficult to raise funds outside the euro area, their return 
on asset ratios have declined, or tensions have emerged in the dollar market. Parallel 
to this, the impact of euro-denominated lending and securities accumulation was 
also felt. This means we can also confirm the theoretical expectations formulated 
in connection with the theoretical model, according to which, due to market 
Figure 6
Variance decomposition of the structural VAR model
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disturbances and the freezing of traditional channels of international capital flows, 
credit institutions really needed foreign currency funds available through swap lines 
between central banks. 
It seems that this market failure was not limited exclusively to the period of the 
2007-2009 global financial crisis, but the effects can also be revealed in a sample 
describing the last 12 years. This is suggested by the fact that although leading 
central banks have made several attempts to suspend interbank swap lines, citing 
the temporary drying-up of credit institutions’ foreign currency liquidity needs, 
these programs had to be relaunched several times and today they are now largely 
part of normal business operations. This also well illustrates the process where the 
philosophy and toolbox of “unconventional” monetary policy, initially considered 
temporary, have now become dominant in the operation of the world’s central 
banks. 
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